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OFF-RESERVATION ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERALINDIAN TRUST RESPONSIBILITY
Adele Fine
I.

INTRODUCTION

The federal government's trust responsibility to Indians is often used
to enforce Indian rights against the federal government.' Courts have been
especially willing to invoke the trust responsibility against federal executive officials entrusted with the management of Indian property held in
trust for tribes by the federal government. 2 Ruling on standards of conduct
applicable to private fiduciaries, courts have awarded money damages and
equitable relief to Indians for executive agency breach of the trust
responsibility through mismanagement of Indian trust property.3
The trust responsibility is not limited to federal action on Indian
reservations however. In recent years, courts have also invoked the trust
responsibility to protect Indian tribes and reservations from the harmful
4
effects of federal actions undertaken off but near Indian reservations.
Federal executive agencies are often responsible for the management of
nearby off-reservation federal projects, and the general question in such
situations is whether executive agency adherence to the trust responsibility
remains unchanged in its transfer from the on-reservation to the offreservation context.
Specifically, one issue is whether executive agencies should be held to
strict fiduciary standards off the Indian reservation, given their legitimate
5
obligations to others whose interests often conflict with Indian interests.
Another issue is whether the trust responsibility should be invoked to
protect only tangible Indian property, as it is when applied to onreservation federal action, or whether it should be broadened to encompass
protection of intangible Indian interests, damage to which is sometimes the
1. On rare occasions, the trust responsibility has also been used as a source of federal power over
Indians. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553
(1903).
2. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is obviously the federal agency most closely associated
with the federal-Indian trust responsibility, but the trust responsibility applies to all federal agencies.
See, e.g., Nance v. Environmental Protection Agency, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.

1081 (1981).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 6-30.
4. This comment does not discuss invocation of the trust responsibility to compel the federal
government to provide services to Indians, which in a sense isalso "off-reservation" enforcement of the
trust responsibility. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415, U.S. 199 (1974); St. Paul Intertribal Housing Bd. v.
Reynolds, 564 F. Supp. 1408 (D. Minn. 1983). See also R. Chambers, JudicialEnforcement of the
Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1243-46 (1975).
5.

See infra text accompanying notes 32-68.
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only damage Indians can point to in the off-reservation context.' This

comment examines the various approaches courts have taken to offreservation enforcement of the federal-Indian trust responsibility, with a
view to assessing their consequences for the preservation of Indian culture.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The trust doctrine was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in
his now famous opinions in the Cherokee cases: Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia7 and Worcester v. Georgia.' In Cherokee Nation, Marshall noted
that the Indians' relationship to the United States was "marked by peculiar
and cardinal distinctions which exist[ed] nowhere else." 9 Indian tribes like
the Cherokees were independent in the sense of being autonomous, selfgoverning entities with an "unquestioned" right to occupy the lands
preserved for them in treaties with the United States.' 0 Nevertheless,
Marshall stated, when the tribes ceded their lands to the United States,
they relinquished their power to control their external relations and instead
looked to the United States for protection.1 1 Indian tribes were thus
"domestic dependent nations" whose relationship to the United States
resembled "that of a ward to his guardian."' 2
The Worcester opinion added no new principles to those Marshall set
out in Cherokee Nation. In Worcester, however, Marshall emphasized the
Indians' status as "distinct, independent political communities" with the
right to govern themselves within their territorial boundaries. a3 This
emphasis suggests that the federal duty of protection extends not only to
protection of Indian land, but to protection of Indian internal governmen4
tal and cultural autonomy as well.'

6. See infra text accompanying notes 69-107.
7. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). In Cherokee Nation, the Tribe petitioned the Supreme Court to
enjoin the state of Georgia from enforcing its laws against the Tribe. Id. at 15. The narrow issue before
the Court was whether the Cherokee Nation was a "foreign state" in a constitutional sense and thus
able to maintain an original action in the Supreme Court. Id. at 16. The Court held that although the
Cherokee Nation constituted a "distinct political society," Id., it was not a foreign nation, and therefore
could not press its claim in the Supreme Court. Id. at 20.
8. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). In Worcester, the petitioner was a missionary who had been
convicted in Georgia of violating a state statute that prohibited whites from residing in Cherokee
Nation territory without a license. Id. at 528-29. Worcester claimed the state statute encroached upon
the federal government's exclusive power to regulate relations with Indian tribes. Id. at 534. The
Supreme Court agreed, claiming the federal constitution, treaties, and federal statues clearly
established the United States' exclusive power in Indian affairs. Id. at 549-62.
9. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
10. Id. at 16-17.
II. Id.at 17.
12. Id.
13. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
14. Id. at 556-57. Although this comment emphasizes the trust responsibility's purpose of
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Early in the twentieth century, tribes began to use the trust responsibility to assert their rights against federal executive agency officials."6 The
typical issue before the courts concerned the conduct of federal executive
officials in the management of tribal lands held in trust for the tribes by the
United States. 6 For example, in United States v. Creek Nation,17 the
Creek Tribe sued the United States for money damages when it discovered
that a federal executive agency had erroneously surveyed reservation
boundaries and sold a portion of Creek land to non-Indians.1 8 On certiorari,
the Supreme Court held the Tribe was entitled to compensation for the
erroneous taking of its reservation land.' 9 The Court noted that, even

though as the Tribe's guardian the federal government exercised complete
control over tribal trust property, the federal government's power was
nevertheless constrained by the limitations "inhering" in the trust
20

responsibility.
The Supreme Court did not address the exact nature of the limitations
inherent in the trust responsibility in the Creek Nation case, but in more
recent money damage suits where federal executive agency management
of tribal trust property has been at issue, courts have construed the trust

responsibility as imposing strict ficudiary duties on federal executive
officials.21 In Navajo Tribe ofIndians v. United States,22 for example, the
Navajo Tribe claimed the federal government breached its trust obligations to the Tribe when the Bureau of Mines, which was responsible for the
supervision of oil and gas leases on the Navajo Reservation, failed to inform
the Tribe that it had assumed an oil and gas lease from a private company
protecting tribal autonomy, courts have also relied on Cherokee Nation and Worcester to emphasize
other purposes of the trust responsibility as well, such as maintaining federal power in Indian affairs as
against state power. See supra note 1; see also Chambers supra note 4 at 1220-23.
15. One of the earliest cases is Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919), where the
Supreme Court enjoined the Secretary of the Interior from disposing of lands owned by the Pueblo
Indians under the federal public land laws based on the federal-Indian trust relationship.
16. Trust lands are lands owned collectively by tribes but which the tribes cannot alienate

without Congressional approval. See F. Cohen,

HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw

509-10 (1982).

17. 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
18. Id. at 106-7.
19. Id. at 108.
20. Id. at 109-10.
21. A leading case is Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942), where the United
States Supreme Court stated: "[U]nder a humane and self-imposed policy . . . [the federal
government] has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its
conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should therefore
be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards." Id. at 296-97. See also United States v. Mitchell,
463 U.S. 206, 224-26 (1983) (Mitchell 11); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 10, 18-19
(1944); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D. Cal.
1973).
22. 364 F.2d 320 (Ct. Cf. 1966).
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that no longer wished to conduct drilling operations on tribal lands.23 The
Tribe sought money damages on grounds that the lease should have been
assigned for the benefit of the Tribe, not the federal government.24 The
Court of Claims held in the Tribe's favor, stating that "[t]he case is
somewhat analogous to that of a fiduciary who learns of an opportunity,
prevents the beneficiary from getting it, and seizes it for himself."25 The
Court thus cast the federal executive official's duty to the Tribe in terms of
a private fiduciary's duty of loyalty to a beneficiary.
Courts have applied the strict fiduciary standard in suits brought by
tribes seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the federal government as well.26 A leading case in this regard is ManchesterBand of Porno
Indians v. United States.2 7 In Manchester Band, the Tribe sought a
declaration stating the Secretary of the Interior's statutory and fiduciary
obligations in the management of tribal funds. 8 The district court found
that, like a reasonably prudent trustee, the Secretary was obligated to
make tribal trust funds under his control productive of income.2 9 Thus, the
Secretary violated his trust responsibility to the Tribe by not investing
tribal funds in accounts bearing higher interest rates than the accounts in
which the funds were invested, even though investments in the latter
accounts did not violate the Secretary's statutory obligations to the Tribe. 30

III.

THE TRUST DOCTRINE APPLIED To OFF-RESERVATION
FEDERAL ACTION

A.

The Issues

The cases discussed above illustrate how the trust doctrine is applied
in situations where executive agency management of tribal lands, natural
resources, and funds is at issue. When the dispute is strictly between the
executive agency responsible for managing trust property and an Indian
tribe or tribal members, courts will invariable reach for principles of
private trust law to determine the nature and scope of the federal
government's duty to the Indians. The ultimate benefit of this approach is
that it furthers the purpose of the trust responsibility as conceived by Chief
Justice Marshall. By holding the federal government to the standard of a

23. Id. at 322-23.
24. Id. at 323.
25. Id. at 324.
26.- The jurisdictional base for such suits is usually the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U S.C.
§§ 551-706 (1982).
27. 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1247.
30. Id. at 1247-48.
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private fiduciary, courts encourage the preservation of Indian property,
and thus Indian political and cultural integrity as well. 31

The federal-Indian trust responsibility in the off-reservation context is
another matter. Several factors come into play which ordinarily do not

arise when the trust responsibility is invoked in disputes concerning onreservation federal activities. First, the federal government is responsible
to others whose interest may conflict with the interests of Indian tribes.
Second, management of tribal trust property is not directly at issue. Third,

other statutes, particularly other environmental statutes, may also be at
issue; federal obligations under these statutes may influence the determination of the scope of the trust responsibility in the off-reservation context.
The influence these factors have on the trust responsibility is the focus of
the remainder of this comment.

B.

The Problem of Conflicting Obligations

One of the first cases in which the trust responsibility was extended to
federal activities off Indian reservations was PyramidLake Paiute Tribe
of Indians v. Morton.32 In PyramidLake, the Department of the Interior

had promulgated a regulation which governed the diversion of water from
a river flowing into Pyramid Lake, located on the Tribe's reservation, to a
federal irrigation project located upstream from the reservation."3 The
diversion of water caused by the off-reservation federal project lowered the
level of the lake, thereby endangering the fish habitat that had always been
the Tribe's principle source of livelihood.3 4 Invoking the Administrative
Procedure Act, the Tribe sued to set aside the regulation as arbitrary and

capricious, claiming the Secretary's decision to divert water from Pyramid
Lake violated the federal-Indian trust responsibility. 5
The District Court for the District of Columbia granted the Tribe's
request. Quoting from Seminole Nation v. United States,36 the court

31. Analogizing the federal government's trust responsibility to that of a private fiduciary is easy
to do in situations where federal management of tangible Indian property is at issue; the traditional
trust law elements of fiduciary, beneficiary, and trust corpus fit well in such situations. See, e.g.,
Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 225. The analogy is more strained, however, when intangible Indian interests
are at stake, such as tribal culture or sovereignty. Courts have been reluctant to invoke the trust
responsibility in such instances. See Chambers supra note 4 at 1242-43. Reluctance could change as a
result of the application of the trust responsibility in the off-reservation context, for in those instances
damage to tangible trust property is not necessarily present. See Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 12
Indian L. Rep. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROGRAM) 3065 (D. Mont. May 28, 1985), discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 41-49 and 90-107.
32. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
33. Id. at 254.
34. Id. at 254-55.
35. Id. at 254.
36. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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reiterated the principle that, in all of its dealings with Indians, the federal
government was to be judged by exacting fiduciary standards." Therefore,
the Secretary of the Interior was not free to devise a regulation based on an
attempted accomodation of competing interests. The trust responsibility
demanded a precisely formulated regulation, the aim of which was to
3
preserve the maximum amount of water possible for the Tribe. 1
The district court's use of the private fiduciary standard in the offreservation context in Pyramid Lake suggests, in one commentator's
words, "an affirmative duty, especially by the Department of the Interior to
protect Indian trust property from injury by other federal projects." 9 At a
minimum, the district court's analysis makes clear the proposition that,
even where federal conduct vis-a-vis Indian trust property is not directly at
issue, Indian interests cannot be summarily overridden by other, seemingly
more pressing federal concerns.4" To the contrary, the government's strict
fiduciary obligation required federal executive officials to give special
consideration to the effects of other federal projects on Indian trust lands.
A more recent case in which trust principles identical to those applied
in PyramidLake were used is NorthernCheyenne Tribe v. Hodel,41 a 1985
decision of the federal district court for the District of Montana. In the
Northern Cheyenne case, the Tribe claimed the Secretary of the Interior
violated his trust obligations because he failed to consider adequately the
socioeconomic and cultural effects of coal development on the Tribe before
holding coal lease sales of tracts of federally-owned coal located just
beyond the Tribe's reservation boundaries.42 In his defense, the Secretary
claimed his obligation to develop federal coal resources taken in the
"national interest," warranted relaxation of his trust responsibilities to the
Northern Cheyenne Tribe.4 3
The district court refused to allow the Secretary any relief from his
trust responsibilities to the Northern Cheyenne.4 4 The court noted at the
outset of its discussion on the trust issue that the "special relationship
imposes strict fiduciary standards of conduct on federal executive agencies
in their dealings with Indian tribes."4 5 The court analyzed the federal

37. Pyramid Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 256.
38. Id. at 256-57.
39. Chambers, supra note 4 at 1234.
40. The water flowing into Pyramid Lake was diverted to an irrigation district and used
primarily for non-Indian agricultural purposes. Pyramid Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 254.
41. 12 Indian L. Rep. (AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROGRAM) 3065 (D. Mont. May 28, 1985).
As in the PyramidLake case, the Tribe in Northern Cheyenne sought declaratory and injunctive relief
using the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982), as the jurisdictional base.
42. Id. at 3066.
43. Id. at 3071.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 3070.
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government's conduct in terms of private fiduciary's duty of loyalty to a
beneficiary. Citing Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States,46 the court
asserted that, like a private fiduciary, the Secretary had a duty to remain
loyal to the Tribe's interests even, indeed especially, in the face of
conflicting obligations to other federal projects. The court stated that the
trust responsibility was all the more important "in situations such as the
present case where an agency's conflicting goals and responsibilities
combined with political pressure asserted by non-Indians can lead federal
agencies to compromise or ignore Indian rights. 14 8 The court ultimately
held that the federal government was under a strict fiduciary obligation to
consider the socioeconomic and cultural impacts of coal development on
the Tribe.4
As applied in Pyramid Lake and Northern Cheyenne, the trust
responsibility is a fairly effective means of protecting Indian tribes from
threatening off-reservation federal activities. However, the argument that
federal obligations to other off-reservation projects should preclude executive.agency adherence to the strict fiduciary standard has been recognized
by the United States Supreme Court in the context of water rights
adjudication." The case, Nevada v. United States,5" is factually distinct
,from cases where equitable relief against the federal government is sought,
but the reasoning of the case stands ready to be transferred to situations
like those presented in Pyramid Lake and Northern Cheyenne.
The Nevada case was filed by the United States on behalf of the
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe shortly after the Pyramid Lake case was
decided. 5 2 The United States sought additional water rights for the
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe to the same river at issue in PyramidLake.53
The defendants asserted res judicata, claiming the United States was
attempting to relitigate water rights already settled in a prior decree., 4 The
District Court for the District of Nevada agreed and dismissed the
46.
47.

See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
Northern Cheyenne, 12 Indian L. Rep. at 3071.

48.

Id.

49. Id.
50. The problem of the federal government's divided loyalty has long been present in water
resource cases like Pyramid Lake, see supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text, where federal
agencies charged with developing water resources sometimes divert water flowing into Indian
reservations to other federal projects, thus causing a conflict with Indian water rights protected under
the Winters doctrine. See Chambers, supra note 4 at 1236 n. 105. On the Winters doctrine, see Cohen,
supra note 16 at 578-604.
51. 463 U.S. I10 (1983).

52. Id. at I18.
In Nevada, the United States and the Tribe sought ageneral stream adjudication
of the water rights of approximately 17,000 water users. United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation
Dist., NO. R-2987 TBA (D. Nev. filed
Dec. 21, 1973).
53. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 118.
54. Id. at 119.
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complaint. 5 5
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part,
holding that, because the Tribe and certain owners of land adjacent to the
reservation were not parties in the prior adjudication, but were both
represented by the United States, and because their interests may have
conflicted, neither could be bound by the prior decree.56 Citing the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, 51 the Ninth Circuit also stated that the
United States breached its duty of "undivided loyalty to the Tribe" by
representing both the Tribe and the landowners in the previous litigation. 8
The United States Supreme Court held on certiorari that resjudicata
prevented the United States and the Tribe from litigating their claim for
additional water rights against anyone. 59 The Supreme Court faulted the
Ninth Circuit for casting the relationship between the United States and
the Tribe in terms of a private trustee-beneficiary relationship. The Court
acknowledged the United States' "strong" fiduciary duty to Indian tribes,
but concluded: "where Congress has imposed upon the United States, in
addition to its duty to represent Indian tribes, a duty to obtain water rights
for reclamation projects . . the analogy of a faithless private fiduciary
cannot be controlling for purposes of evaluating the authority of the United
States to represent different interests. 60° The Supreme Court thus found
that under the circumstances presented in the case, the interests of the
Tribe and the landowners were "sufficiently adverse" to bind both to the
prior decree. 6 '
The Nevada case is distinguishable from PyramidLake and Northern

55. Id.
56. United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286, 1309-11 (9th Cir. 1981),
amended, 666 F.2d 351 (1982).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 & comments p,q,r (1959).
58. Truckee-Carson, 649 F.2d at 1310.
59. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 111.
60. Id. at 142. Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the majority opinion, stated earlier in the decision:
[I] t may well appear that Congress was requiring the Secretary of the Interior to carry
water on at least two shoulders when it delegated to him both the responsibility for the
supervision of the Indian tribes and the commencement of reclamation projects in areas
adjacent to reservation lands. But Congress chose to do this, and it is simply unrealistic to
suggest that the Government may not perform its obligation to represent Indian tribes in
litigation when Congress has obligated it to represent other interests as well. In this regard,
the Government cannot follow the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary, who would
breach his duties to his single beneficiary solely by representing potentially conflicting
interests without the beneficiary's consent. The Government does not "compromise" its
obligation to one interest that Congress obliges it to represent by the mere fact that it
simultaneously performs another task for another interest that Congress has obligated it by
statute to do.
61. Id. at 143. The Court found the necessary adversity in settlement negotiations which
resulted in an agreement between the representative for the landowners and the federal government
prior to issuance of the original water rights decree. Id. at 140.
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Cheyenne in several respects. First, PyramidLake and NorthernCheyenne
were suits for equitable relief in which the issue was whether certain
executive agency decisions were made arbitrarily. 2 The issue in Nevada
was whether res judicataprevented the United States from asserting its
claim for additional water rights. 63 Second, in the Pyramid Lake case at
least, there was only one regulation at issue and one defendant, the
Secretary of the Interior. The defendants in Nevada, on the other hand,
included thousands of landowners, each of whom owned water rights to the
river flowing into the Pyramid Lake. The costly and time-consuming
project of adjusting all of their water rights had the United States
succeeded on the merits may have been a factor in the Supreme Court's
decision to prohibit the United States from proceeding further with its
claim. " ' Finally, the Supreme Court's discussion of the fiduciary-beneficiary relationship in Nevada referred to the federal government's role as
representative in water rights adjudication. 5 Pronouncing the private
fiduciary standard inappropriate in that situation does not necessarily
mean the identical rationale should govern in suits in which tribes seek
declaratory and injunctive relief against the federal government.
Still, the underlying dilemma of the federal government's divided
loyalty is common to all three cases. Arguably, the Supreme Court's
rationale in Nevada could be applied in situations similar to those
presented in Pyramid Lake and Northern Cheyenne. Executive agency
officials administering off-reservation projects have both a trust responsibility to Indians and obligations to other federal projects. If in administering an off-reservation project an executive official's dual obligations come
into conflict, perhaps it is not unreasonable to permit the executive official
some flexibility in accomodating those competing obligations. The argument for flexibility becomes stronger when one adds the fact that Congress
itself instructed the Secretary to carry both obligations simultaneously, 66
and stronger still if the off-reservation project enjoys popular public
support.
62. See supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text.
63. Supra note 53 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 52. In his concurring opinion in Nevada, Justice Brennan stated: "In the final
analysis, our decision today is that thousands of small farmers in northwestern Nevada can rely on
specific promises made to their forebears two and three generations ago. . . despite strong claims on
the part of the Pyramid Lake Paiutes." Id. at 145.
65. The Nevada case has probably laid in its final resting place the proposal to create an

independent Indian Trust Counsel Authority, first proferred by President Nixon in 1970. H.R. Doc.
No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); see also R. Chambers, A Study ofAdministrative Conflicts of
Interest in the Protectionof Indian Natural Resources, Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate Comm. Reprint, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12

(1971).
66.

See supra note 60.
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If federal executive officials were released from the strict fiduciary
standard, however, Indian efforts to preserve tribal cultural autonomy
could be detrimentally affected. Executive agency officials habitually
make decisions through a process of compromise and accomodation. In a
world where Indians have little political clout to begin with, it is difficult to
imagine Indian interests gaining pre-eminence over non-Indian interests if
federal executive officials are permitted to resolve conflicts between
Indians and non-Indians over off-reservation federal projects through a
political process. Federal adherence to the private fiduciary standard
preserves the trust duty of undivided loyalty and compels executive agency
officials to subordinate off-reservation interests to Indian rights protected
by the trust responsibility.67 Thus, the trust obligation to preserve Indian
cultural and political autonomy as articulated by Chief Justice Marshall is
more likely to be fulfilled.
The judicial approach chosen to resolve the problem of the federal
government's conflicting obligations is ultimately a reflection of the
strength of the federal commitment to protecting Indian tribes as distinct
cultural entities. If courts compel executive agency officials to abide by
private fiduciary standards even in their off-reservation activities as
illustrated in the Pyramid Lake and Northern Cheyenne cases, then the
preservation of Indian cultural autonomy is likely to be enhanced. If
executive officials are permitted to relax their trust duties in the offreservation context and thus balance Indian rights along with many other
68
interests, danger to the continued survival of Indian autonomy increases.
C.

Protection of Nonproprietary Indian Interests

The problem of the federal government's conflicting obligations is just one
of the issues that invariably arises in the context of off-reservation
enforcement of the federal-Indian trust responsibility. Another issue that
arises concerns the scope of the trust responsibility. The traditional focus of
the trust responsibility has always been on protection of tribal trust
property, including lands, 69 funds, 70 and natural resources.7 1 Courts have
been reluctant to broaden the trust responsibility's scope to include explicit
protection of nonproprietary Indian interests, like tribal sovereignty or
67. See Chambers supra note 4 at 1235-38 for a discussion of the importance of equitable relief
generally to preserving tribal autonomy.
68. The district court in Northern Cheyenne voiced the same concern, stating: "identifying and
fulfilling the trust responsibility is even more important in situations such as the present case where an
agency's conflicting goals and responsibilities combined with political pressure asserted by non-Indians
can lead federal agencies to compromise or ignore Indian rights." Id., 12 Indian L. Rep. at 3071.
69. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
70. Manchester Band, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
71. Mitchel II, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
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cultural integrity. 72
This focus may be changing, however, as a direct result of the
application of the trust responsibility in the off-reservation context.
Recently, a few tribes have sought equitable relief against federal
executive officials based on alleged violations of both the trust responsibility and the requirements ofcertain environmental statutes. The response of
the courts in these cases has been to intertwine the requirements of the
environmental statutes with the federal government's duties under the
trust responsibility so that the scope of the former determines the scope of
the latter. Depending on what is protected in the environmental statutes, a
favorable decision for Indians may mean that the scope of the trust
responsibility is broadened to include protection of intangible Indian
interests as well as Indian trust property.
One case illustrating this interplay of the trust doctrine and environmental law is North Slope Borough v. Andrus. 3 In North Slope Borough,
representatives of the Inupiat Eskimos of Alaska sued to enjoin the
Secretary of the Interior from proceeding with lease sales to develop
federal oil and gas properties of the north coast of Alaska. 74 The Inupiats
feared that oil and gas development would endanger the Bowhead whales
that migrated through the area, and upon which the Inupiats depended for
their subsistence culture. 75 The representatives claimed in part that the
Secretary violated both the Endangered Species Act 76 (ESA) (the Bowhead whale was on the ESA list of endangered species) 77 and the trust
responsibility in that the Secretary failed to consider adequately the
impact of the potential disappearance of the whales on the traditional
78
Inupiat culture.
The district court for the District of Columbia held the Secretary had
not met the requirements of the ESA, and to that extent he had breached
his duties under the trust responsibility as well. 79 The circuit court reversed
on both issues. It first examined the ESA issue and concluded that the
Secretary had taken the necessary steps to preserve the Bowhead whales as
prescribed by the ESA.80 The court then moved to the issue of the scope of
72.
73.

See Chambers supra note 4 at 1242-43.
642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

74. Id. at 592.
75. Id. at 593.
76.

16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (Supp. 11 1984).

77. Id. at 607-1 1.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 611-13.
North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 344 (D.D.C. 1980).
North Slope Borough, 642 F.2d at 609. Under the ESA, an executive agency undertaking a

federal project which is likely to affect an endangered species must obtain a "biological opinion" from
the agency responsible for the animal to ensure that the project will not jeopardize the animal's
continued existence. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. 111984). In this case, the court found that a letter
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the trust responsibility. It acknowledged the importance of the Bowhead
whales to Inupiat tribal culture, but concluded that, "where the Secretary
has acted responsibly in respect of the environment [by complying with the
ESA], he has implemented responsibly, and protected, the parallel
concerns of the native Alaskans."8' 1 The circuit court thus found that any
duty the federal government had to protect the subsistence culture of the
Inupiat Eskimos was satisfied by its compliance with the ESA.8a
The assumption underlying the circuit court's analysis in North Slope
Borough was that the federal government's duties under the trust responsibility were coextensive with its duties under the environmental statute.
Another case, Nance v. Environmental ProtectionAgency,8 3 followed the
same pattern of analysis. In Nance, the Crow Tribe sought equitable relief
against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), claiming that
EPA's alleged failure to consider the impact of reclassification of the
adjoining Northern Cheyenne Tribe's air quality on coal development
within the Crow Reservation constituted a violation of both the Clean Air
Act 8 4 and the federal trust responsibility to the Crow Tribe. 5 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held first that EPA's conclusions that the air
quality reclassification would not harm coal development in surrounding
areas was proper under the Clean Air Act. 6 The circuit court then held
that, insofar as the EPA complied with the provisions of the Clean Air Act,
it discharged adequately its trust duty to protect the Crow Tribe's interest
in developing coal on its reservation. 87 Like the court in North Slope
from the National Marine Fisheries Service to the Bureau of Land Management, in which possible
danger to the Bowhead whale was discussed, constituted a "biological opinion" within the meaning of
the ESA. North Slope Borough, 642 F.2d at 610.
81. Id. at 612.
82. The court's emphasis on the ESA was influenced largely by the United States Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell 1), 445 U.S. 535 (1980). In Mitchell I. the
Supreme Court held the General Allotment Act created no enforceable fiduciary duties to Indian
allottees and thus could not be used as the substantive basis upon which to bring a money damages
claim against the federal government under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982). Id. at 538-42.
Even though the claim in North Slope Borough was for equitable rather than monetary relief, the court
borrowed the Mitchell I rationale for its finding that a trust responsibility existed only if Congress's
intent to create the trust responsibility was unambiguously stated in a statute, treaty or executive order.
North Slope Borough, 642 F.2d at 611-12; See also Newton, Enforcing the Federal Indian Trust
Relationship after Mitchell, 31 CATH. U. L. REv. 635, 673-79 (1982). The court found the ESA
created only a limited trust responsibility to the Inupiat Eskimos insofar as the statute exempted the
Alaskan Natives from prohibitions against hunting endangered species, which signified the federal
government's recognition of its trust responsibility to protect the Alaskan Natives' subsistence hunting
rights. Id. at 612. This right was protected, according to the court, by the Secretary of the Interior's
compliance with the ESA. Id.
83. 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1982).
85. Nance, 645 F.2d at 705.
86. Id. at 705-8.
87. Id. at 711.
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Borough, the Ninth Circuit in Nance construed the scope of the trust
responsibility as being coextensive with the scope of the environmental
statute.
Neither North Slope Borough nor Nance signify any radical expansion of the scope of the trust responsibility, for in both cases the major
emphasis was on the environmental statutes rather than trust principles. In
North Slope Borrough, the court was unwilling to state that the federal
government's trust obligations independently required it to protect traditional Inupiat culture from the threats posed by off-reservation federal oil
and gas exploration.88 The circuit court in Nance was more generous;
although the court concluded that EPA compliance with the Clean Air Act
resolved the trust responsibility issue, the court implied that the trust
responsibility itself obligated the federal government to avoid off-reservation activities which would discourage tribal resource development on the
Crow reservation.8 9
A stronger statement of the scope of the trust responsibility in the offreservation context is found in the Northern Cheyenne case,9 0 where the
double violation of an environmental statute and the trust responsibility
was also present. The district court in that case considered both North
Slope Borough and Nance in its analysis of the issues before it,91 but it did
not explicitly collapse the scope of the trust responsibility with the scope of
the environmental statute as the courts in the other two cases did. Instead,
the court maintained the distinction between the federal government's
duties under the trust responsibility and its duties under the environmental
statute. Even as the court did so, however, it incorporated the requirements
of the latter into the former. The result was a strong, independent federal
obligation to investigate and mitigate the potentially harmful effects on an
Indian tribe of federal action undertaken adjacent to the reservation.
The Northern Cheyenne reservation is located amidst vast tracts of
federally-owned coal in southeastern Montana. 2 In 1982, as part of a
nationwide coal development program begun in the late 1970's, the
Department of the Interior9 3 began leasing various tracts surrounding the

88. North Slope Borrough, 642 F.2d at 612. Interestingly, the court also noted in regard to the
federal government's competing obligations that "no one can claim that the interests of the Eskimos
. * were an overriding veto staying the Secretary's hand with respect to other public concerns.
Discretion, though, is given to the Secretary to make responsible decisions which balance the public and
social interest involved." Id. at 612-13.
89. Nance, 645 F.2d at 711.
90. 12 Indian L. Rep. (AM. INDIAN LAW TRAINING PROGRAM) 3065 (D. Mont. May 28,1985);
see supra text accompanying notes 39-46.
91. Northern Cheyenne, 12 Indian L. Rep. at 3070-71.
92. Id. at 3065.
93. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) was the agency within the Department of the
Interior responsible for the federal coal development program.
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reservation to coal developers.9 4 The lease sales were governed by coal
management regulations which in turn required the Department to
complete a regional environmental impact statement (EIS) on the alternate lease sale schedules according to the provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).95 The Northern Cheyenne Tribe,
requesting equitable relief, claimed the regional EIS completed prior to the
coal lease sales was deficient under NEPA because the Secretary failed to
consider the sociological and economic effects of coal development on the
Northern Cheyenne Tribe. 96 The Tribe also contended the Department's
failure to consider such impacts constituted a breach of the federal-Indian
trust responsibility.97
The district court considered the NEPA issue first. The Department
argued that NEPA primarily required an assessment of the impacts of coal
development on the natural, physical environment, not an assessment of
social and economic impacts.98 The court disagreed. It found that if an EIS
was otherwise required to assess a proposed project's effects on the physical
environment, then the agency drafting the EIS was also required to
identify the social and economic effects flowing as a result of the disruption
to the physical environment. 99 In the Northern Cheyenne case, the effects
to be considered included population increases due to the influx of miners
and their families into the area, increased demands on local governments,
and increased needs for housing, schools, and other services.1"'
The court stressed that identifying and mitigating the harmful
socioeconomic effects of coal development on the Northern Cheyenne
Tribe was especially important because the Tribe was a "culturally
discrete" entity in the area.' 0 ' Because of the unique structure of political,
economic and cultural life within the Northern Cheyenne reservation, coal
development was likely to affect the Northern Cheyenne differently than it
would people living in nearby white communites. The court faulted the EIS
for its sparse references to the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 0 2 which in the

94. Northern Cheyenne, 12 Indian L. Rep. at 3065.
95. Id. at 3066. NEPA is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4361 (1982). The coal management
regulations, 43 C.F.R. § 3400-3400.5 (1985), were promulgated in part under the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act of 1976 (FCLAA), 30 U.S.C. § 201-209 (1982) and the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328 (1982).
96. Northern Cheyenne, 12 Indian L. Rep. at 3066.
97. Id. at 3070-71.
98. Id. at 3067.
99. Id. at 3067-68.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 3068.
102. Id. The court stated:
The EIS, for example, does not acknowledge the existence of the tribal government and its
powers and responsibilities, does not recognize that the reservation is culturally distinct
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court's view indicated an erroneous assumption by the Department that it
could treat the Tribe "merely as potentially affected citizens" rather than
as a unique cultural entity. 103 The court agreed with the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe that the Department's failure to consider the Tribe as a
distinct entity for purposes of compliance with NEPA requirements was a
fatal flaw of the EIS.104
This concern for protecting the Northern Cheyenne Tribe as a distinct
entity was carried over into the court's discussion of the federal government's duties under the trust responsibility. As noted earlier, however, the
court did not look explicitly to the provisions of NEPA to determine the
scope of the trust responsibility in the off-reservation context. Instead, the
court relied on traditional trust doctrine principles, especially the private
fiduciary's duty of loyalty to the beneficiary, 105 to judge the Secretary's
conduct in fulfilling his trust obligations. The reliance on strict fiduciary
principles ensured that the federal government's trust responsibility,
whatever it encompassed, would stand independently of the environmental
statute.
For its ultimate holding on the trust responsibility issue, however, the
district court referred back to the EIS' deficiencies noted earlier in its
discussion of the federal government's duties under NEPA. Following its
NEPA holding, the district court claimed the trust responsibility obligated
the Secretary to identify and mitigate the unique social and economic
impacts of coal development on the Tribe.108 Thus, "treating the Northern
Cheyenne like merely citizens of the affected area and reservation land like
any other real estate. . . violated this trust responsibility. 10 7 Though the
district court made no direct connection between NEPA's requirements
and those of the trust responsibility, in the end the two were identical.
What distinguishes the Northern Cheyenne case from North Slope
Borough and Nance is that, even though the district court in Northern
Cheyenne probably could not have defined the scope of the trust responsibility as it did except by reference to NEPA, its reliance on traditional trust
law principles guaranteed that the trust responsibility would have independent force. Traditional trust doctrine principles did not play nearly the
important role in North Slope Borough and Nance as they did in Northern
Cheyenne. As a result, the trust responsibility in those cases was more a pro
within the region, and does not consider that the different structure of public finance on the

reservation may vary the tribe's ability to mitigate the impacts of increased coal
development as compared to surrounding communities.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 3069.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
106. Northern Cheyenne, 12 Indian L. Rep. at 3071.
107. Id.
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forma concept that depended on the environmental statute for the limited
vitality it did have. Based on Northern Cheyenne, however, tribal advocates in future cases may argue that, regardless of whether the federal
government violated any environmental statute in its off-reservation
activities, the federal-Indian trust responsibility obligates executive agencies to identify and mitigate any adverse impacts resulting from offreservation federal projects which could harm the cultural integrity of a
nearby Indian tribe. The ingredients going into Northern Cheyenne were
much the same as those in North Slope Borough and Nance, but because of
the district court's emphasis on the strict fiduciary standard as opposed to
the environmental statute, even as the court incorporated the statute's
requirements into those of the trust responsibility, the scope of the trust
responsibility was broadened to include explicit protection of nonproprietary Indian interests.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Cherokee cases suggest that one of the primary purposes of the
trust responsibility is to protect the land base of Indian tribes and the tribes'
cultural and political autonomy. This purpose is more likely to be realized
if the federal government, through its executive agencies, is held to the
standard of a private fiduciary in its dealings with Indian tribes. The
federal government knowing it may be sued for breach of trust according to
private trust law principles, has an incentive to preserve tribal trust
property and guard tribal interests in the best possible manner.
Federal adherence to the strict fiduciary standard is more difficult to
maintain when executive agencies are charged with administering offreservation projects that may adversely affect nearby Indian tribes. Some
may think it entirely unrealistic and inefficient to hold the federal
government to such a standard in these circumstances. As the courts in
Pyramid Lake and Northern Cheyenne indicated, however, the strict
fiduciary standard may be crucial in the off-reservation context if Indian
rights are not to be ignored entirely. Strict adherence to the trust
responsibility is especially important when the pressure to compromise
that responsibility increases.
The trust responsibility may be strengthened if the opportunity to
incorporate the requirements of other environmental statutes arises.
Traditionally, the scope of the trust responsibility extended only to
protection of tangible Indian trust property. The threats to Indian tribes
posed by off-reservation federal projects, however, are often less concrete
in nature, since immediate harm to Indian trust property is not always
present. As the Northern Cheyenne case illustrates, environmental statutes
which require the federal government to identify and protect important
cultural values may be combined with the government's trust duties to
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effectively broaden the scope of the trust responsibility to include protection of Indian cultural and political integrity. Once again, however, the
ultimate situation depends on whether the trust responsibility is given
independent force through the application of traditional trust law principles. Indian tribes must always struggle to remain culturally and politically
distinct from the dominant white culture. To the extent the trust responsibility helps Indian tribes, federal government adherence to the standard of
a private fiduciary in its off-reservation activities and explicit recognition
that the trust responsibility includes protection of tribal sovereignty and
culture will ensure that the struggle is not a hopeless one.

